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Abstract 
 
The overall aim of this paper is to contribute to debates on the relationships between citizenship and 
migration in the UK context in the light of recent changes in UK immigration policy. In particular, it 
focuses on the question of what an increasingly neo-assimilationist state articulation of national 
belonging means for transnational migrants living in Britain. The paper begins by charting the evolving 
nature of citizenship conceptualisations in Western neoliberal contexts and illustrates how Britain has 
responded to this shifting landscape. The context is one of enhanced ‘migration securitization’ wherein 
the state implies that the integrity of the nation state and its security can only be assured if migration 
flows and migrants themselves are closely controlled and monitored. This has led to Britain attempting 
to bolster the formal institution of citizenship (with its attendant rights and responsibilities) and tie it 
more explicitly to notions of belonging to the nation. Through research with national/regional policy 
officials and migrant organisations this paper firstly examines the political landscape of citizenship and 
belonging in Britain as it relates to migrants. Secondly, it draws on research with African transnational 
migrants in northern England to explore their senses of belonging and ask whether these cohere with 
the described state discourse or whether their feelings of belonging exist in tension with neo-
assimilationist policies designed to promote a core national identity.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The inspiration for this paper comes from two sources related to citizenship and belonging in Britain. 
The first was a depressingly familiar irritation at Phil Woolas1 upon his recent suggestion that would-
be citizens of Britain will hasten their feelings of belonging to their new nation through learning the 
revered practice of forming an orderly queue; "the simple act of taking one's turn is one of the 
things that holds our country together. It is very important that newcomers take their place in 
                                                          
1
 Phil Woolas was the Minister of State for Borders and Immigration in the UK until the change of Government 
in May 2010. This research for this paper was undertaken before the General Election on May 6
th
 2010 so is 
primarily a commentary on the policies of the Labour Government up to this date, although I discuss the 
evolving immigration, integration and citizenship policies of the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
Government where relevant and helpful.  
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queues whether it is for a bus or a cup of tea” (Telegraph 2010). The suggestion that belonging to 
Britain partially revolves around understanding the art of queuing as a quintessential element of 
Britishness ostensibly appears as dismissible as the infamous Norman Tebbit ‘cricket-test’ of 19902. 
At the time Tebbit’s comments were seen as an attack on multiculturalism; yet this is a shadow that 
continues to be cast on contemporary integration and cohesion debates with recent concerns 
intensifying around an arguable ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ (Back et al. 2002, Kundnani 2007, 
Modood 2008, Cameron 2011).  
 
This links to the second point of departure for this paper; the inspiration I draw from those fellow 
academics interpreting statements like Woolas’ as indicative of the British Government’s retreat 
from multiculturalist idiom and its embracing of an increasingly neo-assimilationist policy climate 
around immigration, citizenship and belonging (e.g. Joppke 2004, Kofman 2005, Tyler 2010). My own 
evolving thinking on this topic is in the context of research with migrants in Britain who embody 
transnational and stretched belongings (Waite 2009, Waite and Cook 2010). How do such migrants 
respond to policy environments where, “continued loyalty to one’s place of origin is inimical to 
membership and belonging in the society of settlement” (Nagel 2009, p. 405) due to, “increasingly 
vociferous demands for undivided loyalty and affiliation to national cultures and polities” (Kofman 
2005, p.  464)?  
 
The main aim of this paper is to focus on the question of what an increasingly neo-assimilationist 
state articulation of national belonging means for transnational migrants living in Britain. As such, 
the paper will first chart the evolving nature of citizenship conceptualisations in Western neoliberal 
contexts and illustrate how Britain has responded to this shifting landscape; in part by increasingly 
incorporating notions of belonging into the policy landscape of citizenship. Parts 2 and 3 of the 
                                                          
2
 In April 1990 Norman Tebbit controversially suggested a ‘cricket test’ (whether people from ethnic minorities 
supported the England cricket team or the team from their country of origin) to be a good barometer of 
whether migrants have integrated and are truly British. 
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paper examine this area of citizenship, and then belonging, through incorporating the insights of key 
informants in the research. Second, in part 4 the paper explores whether transnational migrants’ 
own senses of belonging cohere with the discussed state discourse or whether their feelings of 
belonging exist in tension with neo-assimilationist policies designed to promote a core national 
identity.  
 
The paper draws upon findings from a larger research project that explored the experiences of 
African migrants in Britain, France and South Africa; this paper comes from just the British element 
of the research carried out during 2008/09. The study was comprised firstly of seven key informant 
interviews with regional and national policy officials, migrant organisations and community 
representatives, and secondly, biographical interviews and focus groups with African migrants3. 
Parts 2 and 3 of the paper include insights drawn from the four key informant interviews who were 
selected to represent different parts of the citizenship and migration landscape; one from a national 
migration enforcement agency, one from a regional migration partnership organisation; and two 
from national migrant advocacy organisations4.  
 
Part 4 of the paper focuses on the experiences of African migrants themselves. Although migrant 
participants for the larger research project came from four African communities; Sudanese, Somali, 
Kenyan and Zimbabwean5, this paper is based on research with just Somali and Kenyan migrants in 
order to more sensitively frame the salient differences and similarities between these two 
nationality groups. The participants live in sizeable urban locations in the Yorkshire & Humber region 
of northern England. These locations were chosen due to the relative paucity of studies of African 
migrants in this region in comparison to other metropolitan areas. As such, the urban locations are 
                                                          
3
 The key informant interviews, the focus groups and a portion of the biographical interviews were carried out 
in English whilst the remainder of the biographical interviews were conducted in the first language of the 
participant with an appropriately trained interpreter. 
4
 All of these key informants were senior personnel in their respective organisations. 
5
 These four African communities were selected based upon their countries of origin being former British 
colonies or protectorates and their numbers and settlement patterns within the Yorkshire and Humber region.  
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large enough to be home to a number of nationality and faith-based community groups, but of 
course at a lower density in comparison to London. Kenyan migration has a long standing history in 
the UK; originally this population in the UK contained mostly students but due to unrest in Kenya 
post-1980 more families moved for employment and settled in the UK, with certain urban areas in 
Yorkshire and the Humber known to be key destinations (IOM 2006a:12). The history of Somali 
migration is also lengthy (Somali seamen came to work in the British Merchant Navy from the early 
20th century) with a high occurrence of three generation families in the region. This population 
constitutes the majority of Muslim families in this study’s sample and was also chosen for its diverse 
migration paths. Somalis originally moved for employment (industrial work in the 1950s/60s), 
followed by increasing numbers coming as refugees from the 1990s onwards (due to civil war) to 
more recent waves of secondary migration from other EU countries that have swelled numbers over 
the last 10 years (IOM 2006b). 
 
The project carried out 20 biographical interviews within 10 families of Somali and Kenyan origin; 
one parent and one child generation interview in each family, but the focus of this paper is only on 
the parent/first generation migrants (see Waite and Cook 2010 for further intergenerational 
analysis).  Three focus groups were also conducted within the two communities, organised by 
gender and age where appropriate. All of the first generation participants in this study have lived in 
Britain for at least five years6, with the longest period of residence being 40 years, and their ages 
range from 40-60s. The first generation migrants have come to Britain via a range of migration 
paths; refugees, family joiners following a lead migrant’s successful asylum application, students 
who later receive work permits, economic migrants coming to fulfil specific labour market 
opportunities such as health workers in the NHS, and via EU citizenship gained through an asylum 
application on the continent followed by secondary migration to the UK. As such the participants 
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 This was to eliminate very new migrants from the sample; 5 years was deemed to be a reasonable length of 
time to experience life in new communities and the broad policy environment. 
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have a variety of residency and citizenship statuses; these will be elaborated upon where relevant in 
the following paper7.  
 
2: Citizenship into 21st century Britain 
 
A significant part of the story of evolving citizenship conceptualisations is related to migration as this 
has had profound effects on citizenship as both an institution and a practice. As Stasuilis (2008, p. 
134) states, “migration is a force that splinters, spatially disperses and complicates citizenship”. 
Migration trends pose a challenge to traditional Westphalian notions of national citizenship that 
were originally envisaged as a set of exclusionary rights that established claims to collective 
resources in territorially-bound nation-states (Isin and Tuner 2007). As Isin (2002) has argued, in this 
historic sense citizenship was a mark of belonging and commitment to a specific place and the rights 
and responsibilities of citizenship were performed in this rooted civic context. The migration of 
people fractures this assumption. Enhanced movement of people across the globe has increasingly 
questioned the integrity of a bounded nation-state with its corollary notion of bounded citizenship. 
 
It is such questioning that led many scholars in the 1990s to suggest that citizenship is losing its 
importance as a political concept due to patterns and processes of globalisation and migration. 
Notable here is Soysal (1994) who suggested that ‘postnational citizenship’ increasingly exists for 
migrants as their rights depend much less on a nation-state’s articulation of citizenship. Although 
Soysal’s central thread of postnational citizenship has provoked much critique (e.g. Hansen 1998, 
Schuster and Solomos 2002), the thesis heralded a stream of literature exploring the experiences of 
citizenship among migrants in a quintessentially globalised era. In recognition that neither migrants’ 
                                                          
7 The data is referenced in square brackets to retain the anonymity of the respondent. Key informant codes 
are as follows; national migration enforcement agency (KI1), regional migration partnership organisation (KI2), 
national migrant advocacy organisations (KI3, KI4). In the quotes the abbreviation R refers to ‘respondent’ and 
I to ‘interviewer’, and three square bracketed ellipsis dots are used to indicate that a few words have been 
edited to remove repetitions or to clarify the meanings of confused speech.  
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social, political and economic existence nor the practices of states are any longer contained within 
state boundaries, literature in this field became increasingly refracted through transnational and 
diasporic optics. A consensus that the nation was increasingly de-territorialising across state 
boundaries led to the emergence of concepts such as ‘flexible citizenship’ (Ong 1999), ‘instrumental 
citizenship’ (Ip et al. 1997), ‘multi-layered citizenship’ (Yuval-Davis 1999, 2000) and ‘hybrid 
citizenship’ (Stasuilis 2004).  
 
Such literature, although distinctive in certain regards, all challenges “an older topography in which 
territoriality was dominant” (Amin et al. 2003, p. 6) and draws upon the central notion of citizenship 
being rescaled above the nation-state (Desforges et al. 2005). Citizenship is arguably now 
increasingly defined and articulated through engagement with different scales of political authority 
and with a range of other social identities. We therefore see, for example, notions of ‘global 
citizenship’ and ‘European citizenship’ and the regular appearance of new transnational citizenships 
based on ethnic, cultural or religious identities promoted by diasporic communities or faith groups. 
Such multiple and transnational citizenships were once anathema to the nation-state system but are 
now increasingly common place; for instance there are now many examples of dual or multiple 
citizenships where membership is shared between two or more nation-states (Baubock 1994, 
Bloemraad 2004).  
 
Some of the literature that follows Soysal’s postnationalism appears to place citizenship in this 
period of global interconnectedness on an almost ‘ethereal plane’ (Stausilis 2008) above nation-
states and territories. Extensive migration is suggested to have caused citizenship to have become 
an unbounded concept that is variously postnational, postmodern and de-territorialised. Such de-
centering of the nation-state from the practices and processes of citizenship, however, has provoked 
much criticism (Kofman 2002). Stasuilis (2008) argues that citizenship is indeed being loosened and 
pluralised with migration, but stops short of concluding that this means we must abandon the ties 
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between citizenship and a bounded nation-state. A more accurate imagery perhaps is to think about 
the “pluralisation and respatialisation of citizenship” (Stasuilis 2008, p. 134) through the lens of 
transnationalism without disregarding the influence of the nation-state. Jones and MacLeod (2004) 
similarly argue that although new forms of transnational relational networks have become 
increasingly important in recent years, they suggest the persistent significance of territorially 
bounded places in constituting the realities of contemporary citizenship.  
 
There is another important element to this brief charting of changing citizenship conceptualisations 
that emerges in Western neoliberal contexts in the 21st century. Soysal’s postnationalism ideas 
critically appeared before the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA that heralded what many 
commentators refer to as a new era of state-led securitisation (Furedi 2002, 2005, Butler 2004). 
Soysal’s arguments broadly hinge on the postulated reduced significance of the nation-state, but the 
terrorist activities of the early part of the 21st century (e.g. USA in 2001, Bali in 2002, Madrid in 2004, 
London in 2005) have led to many Western neoliberal states re-asserting their roles around an 
interventionist security agenda. Within the last decade ‘security’ has emerged as a central 
preoccupation of many governments with the associated term of ‘securitization’ being commonly 
employed (Buzan et al. 1998). States are increasingly creating a broad ‘security continuum’ (Bigo 
1994) that stretches from terrorism to action against crime and includes migratory flows (Walters 
2004, Amoore 2006, Staeheli and Nagel 2008). Many states are therefore promoting the 
maintenance of security as their principal contribution to the functioning of society; and immigration 
policies are inextricably entwined in this agenda. Within the British context the United Kingdom 
Borders Agency (UKBA8) is at the forefront of this securitization agenda and the ‘tracking’ of 
migrants is central to their work:  
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 The UK Border Agency is an agency of the Home Office. It is a global organisation with 25,000 staff - including 
more than 9,000 warranted officers - operating in local communities, at the UK’s borders and across 135 
countries worldwide. 
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I think terrorism clearly has an impact, and the public’s perception of terrorism has a very 
significant impact because the public and ministers want to know that people coming into 
the country are coming in with positive intentions to contribute to society not the intention to 
damage society. [KI1, national migration enforcement agency]  
 
In many countries citizenship had arguably become a somewhat ‘thin’ concept in the latter half of 
the twentieth century (Joppke 2004). Yet a consequence of enhanced ‘migration securitization’ amid 
the more general securitization agenda outlined above has been the attempt to bolster the formal 
institution of citizenship (with its rights and responsibilities) within the immigration landscape and 
tie it more explicitly to notions of civic integration and belonging through social cohesion policies 
(see section 3). At a broad brush level, states argue (or at the least, imply) that the integrity of the 
nation state and its security can only be assured if migration flows and migrants themselves are 
closely controlled and monitored; and citizenship policies are emerging as important elements of 
this control agenda (Gilbert, 2007)9. It is this active managerialist approach to migration (Kofman 
2005) that has increasingly been characterising British immigration policies as the UK border security 
and immigration system has recently undergone the biggest shake-up for 45 years10 (CLG 2008: 10) 
to leave a system of control and surveillance that is graphically depicted through the quote below:  
 
They [British government] provided inflated assurances that migration could be kept under 
control in a highly detailed way. That when people were admitted into the country they'd 
know their names, they'd know their biometrics, they'd know exactly where they were going 
to be living, they'd be directed towards particular jobs with very specific employment 
                                                          
9
 It is important to point out that attainment of full British citizenship (naturalisation) is not achieved by all 
migrants; either because the migrant doesn’t fulfil citizenship requirements or they actively choose not to 
pursue the lengthy (and expensive) British citizenship acquisition (see section 4). Yet the broader policy of 
‘pathways to citizenship’ is closely linked to immigration policies as it covers all the different immigration 
statuses subsequent to point of entry. This leaves a landscape of control and monitoring of migrants up to 
potential citizenship acquisition being implicated when the state talks of pathways to citizenship. 
10
 The two most significant policies of this shake-up are the new Points Based System and the Borders, 
Immigration and Citizenship Act 2009. 
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contracts, they'd be kept under high levels of surveillance while they were here and the 
minute they stepped out of line then the state would reach in, grab hold of them chuck them 
out. The circumstances in which they would be allowed long-term residence would be highly 
policed, highly controlled. [KI3,national migrant advocacy organisation] 
 
We are therefore in the position in Britain, as Kofman (2005, p. 464) succinctly states, where “the 
nation-state continues to frame the exercise of citizenship and difference for migrants” due to 
citizenship being increasingly differentiated by mobility and associated hierarchies of transnational 
status (Gilbert 2007). Such ‘neoliberalization of citizenship’ (Sparke 2006) leaves UKBA as an 
organisation primarily focused upon tracking, surveillance and enforcement: 
 
You can try and understand migration better but they [UKBA] are not really an organisation 
that is into understanding migration. They worry more about enforcement. [KI2, regional 
migration partnership organisation] 
 
We are clear that if the deal is you come and you have a period of study or work, that’s 
something we will enforce where we possibly can so if we meet people through our regular 
visits, people who are not meant to be here we’ll take action to deport them. [...] I think 
there’s a balance to be struck between increasing the freedom to be able to travel and 
making sure that the people that travel into the UK are coming with the right intentions and 
following the deal when you come in, which is that you come in on terms that are agreed 
before you do so and you leave again. So I think it’s not just the coming but it’s also the going 
that matters. [KI1, national migration enforcement agency, my emphasis]  
 
Several of the key informants in this research were concerned that such a focus on enforcement was 
symptomatic of the scaling up of migration management from civil society to a much more centrist 
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state involvement that leaves one key informant characterising government discourse as 
“xenophobic, bureaucratic, public relations management style” [KI4, national migrant advocacy 
organisation]11. This key informant observes: 
 
It is said [by government policies] that British society has no capacity at the level of civil 
interactions to be able to generate policies and solutions to the inevitable frictions of 
migration. And that everything has to be handled by a highly centralised system. 
Paradoxically this doesn’t provide the assurance that the government felt that they were 
providing, it actually hikes up the paranoia when people are being told, you know, identity 
cards and Crimestopper telephone numbers to report ‘suspicious people’ and so on. [...] We 
basically call for civil servants and policy makers to resist the paranoid control agenda, and 
to insist that there are other social objectives that need to be pursued through immigration 
policy, other than just mechanisms for arresting and detaining and deporting migrants. [KI3, 
national migrant advocacy organisation]  
 
Within such a policy and institutional context, British citizenship for migrants is becoming ever-more 
conditional on fulfilling multiple rules and conditions of entry, work and residence. Britain has 
constructed a vast edifice of civic stratification (Kofman 2002, Morris 2002) which streams migrants 
into specific categories and awards differential rights and contingent access to citizenship; even 
those migrants not intending/unable to undergo naturalisation feel the monitoring and control 
agenda of the Government acutely. Such immigration policies are thought to complicate the 
landscape not only for people working in the field but also for members of the public: 
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 Echoing this assertion of a xenophobic surveillance environment, is a recent May 2011 report by the UKBA 
Chief Inspector John Vine which reports that UKBA receives a substantial 2,100 allegations of potential 
immigration offences per week from members of the public; demonstrating significant appetite among a 
population fed on immigration fear to report perceived transgressors (see 
http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/independent-chief-inspector-publishes-report-on-intelligence/)  
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It’s hard enough for people who are professionals to understand the intricacies of the 
different levels of status and the different groups. The public are never going to grasp it. All 
they see is people living here who didn’t used to live here and they look a bit different, they 
speak a bit different. [KI2, regional migration partnership organisation] 
 
An integral part of the resurgence of citizenship in a post-9/11 migration securitisation era has been 
the extent to which belonging has been increasingly linked to citizenship; and it is to this relationship 
that the next section now turns. 
 
3: The demand to belong 
 
The notion of belonging12 has recently become politically salient in Britain as ideas of citizenship 
have increasingly mobilised the concept. The previous section’s outlining of an era of ‘migration 
securitisation’ is critical here. As Anthias (2006, p. 17) suggests, “[c]urrent debates around borders, 
security and social cohesion have reinforced the importance of engaging critically with the notion of 
belonging and its centrality to people’s lives as well as political practice”. It is such a political 
landscape of securitisation where the relationship between citizenship and belonging comes sharply 
into focus. We are at a particular historical juncture in Britain where the state is increasingly 
stipulating that “migrants may enter and settle on condition that they fulfil specific obligations and 
ways of belonging” (Kofman 2005, p. 454, my emphasis). Hence we have been witnessing the Labour 
Government’s assertion that strong national belonging for migrants is critical to their settlement, 
integration and participation in civic life (Laurence and Heath 2008). The strategy of ‘managed 
migration’ therefore emerged because the Labour Government was increasingly preoccupied with 
                                                          
12 Definitions of belonging vary due to it being invoked in many realms (Mee and Wright 2009), but belonging 
is perhaps most commonly described with regard to a ‘sense of belonging’ and an exploration of ‘feelings of 
being in place’; for example Anthias (2006, p. 21) says that belonging is about the ways in which, “social place 
has resonances with stability of the self, or with feelings of being part of a larger whole and with the emotional 
and social bonds that are related to such places”. 
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notions of national identity and social cohesion; and the early signs since May 2010 are that the new 
Coalition Government is continuing with a broad framework of restrictive managed migration in 
their efforts to enhance integration and counter perceived segregation (see, for example, BBC 2011). 
Events such as the urban disturbances in northern England in 2001 are seen as critical threats to 
national security. There has been policy-maker concern that such destabilising events are occurring 
due to the fragilities of nationhood (Lewis and Neal 2005) and migrants feeling senses of non-
belonging to the nation which lead to an erosion of social cohesion and the blocking of good 
relations between diverse people resident in same place13. It is important to note of course that the 
demand for social cohesion (which as a term, rather like integration and segregation, has multiple 
political and scholarly meanings ; Phillips 2007, Simpson et al 2007) is also directed towards deemed 
marginalised and disenfranchised citizens (who may or may not once have been migrants 
themselves) and not only newcomers; but my focus in this paper is on the implications of the 
demand to belong for first generation migrants.  
 
The harmonious ‘rubbing-along’ of diverse peoples within the same communities/neighbourhoods is 
of course a broad definition of multiculturalism. Yet many commentators suggest that we are now 
witnessing Britain, with its historic commitment to multiculturalism, retreating from such a policy 
position and instead pursuing neo-assimilationist agendas (e.g. Home Office 2002, 2003, 2005, see 
also Sveinsson 2010 and Cameron’s (2011) recent pronouncement that ‘multiculturalism is dead’14). 
Britain’s concern regarding the integration and cohesion of its diverse populations appears to be 
manifesting in a set of policies designed to promote a core national identity around a set of 
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 This is despite the comprehensive refuting of Trevor Phillips’ infamous ‘sleepwalking into segregation’ 
statement in 2005 by researchers such as Finney and Simpson (2009) who report an increase in ethnic mixing, 
greater tolerance in social attitudes and more mixed-ethnicity friendship groups among diverse communities 
in Britain since 2001.  
14
 Berkeley (2011), of Runnymede Trust, usefully points out that Cameron’s pronouncement is unhelpful not 
least in how it confuses the policy agenda of multiculturalism (interpreted by Cameron as the promotion of 
separate religious and ethnic identities at the expense of common values) with the grounded understanding of 
multiculturalism for most people; which is that it allows for the recognition of different identities in a shared 
political space within a framework of human rights.  
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irreducible values that are deemed to be emblematic of British society. And with regard to migrants, 
it is citizenship that is frequently being placed centre stage in the state’s desire to cultivate national 
belonging and good relations amongst its communities (Isin and Turner 2007). Indeed, some 
commentators go further than this and argue that citizenship policies in Britain have been explicitly 
designed precisely in order to govern populations (Tyler 2010).  
 
Citizenship was therefore particularly used in the sunset years of the Labour Government as a tool to 
galvanise and encourage migrants’ feelings of belonging to a unitary nation. The demand to belong 
to a singular national identity was the unambiguous message, and the citizenship and immigration 
discourse made it implicitly clear that the British Government saw migrants as a group who may 
embody diluted senses of national loyalty due to transnational and diasporic belongings. The 
Borders, Immigration and Citizenship Act 2009 under Labour built on the Green Paper ‘The Path to 
Citizenship’ (Home Office 2008) and both were couched in notions of ‘Britishness’ (Ward 2004). The 
Act and document encompassed a suite of policies around citizenship that demonstrated a more 
centrist, civic direction of policy and encapsulated the demand for loyalty to Britain (Joppke 2004) in 
the hope that this enhanced social cohesion (Rimmer 2008):  
 
Only the migrants who are prepared to commit themselves to a sort of pre-defined notion of 
‘Britishness’ will be allowed to stay in the long-term. [KI3, national migrant advocacy 
organisation] 
 
Hence hopeful new British citizens have to fulfil English language requirements, take a citizenship 
test and undergo a citizenship ceremony with an allegiance oath. The message was clear – national 
citizenship is the route to belong to Britain (Fortier 2005), and a sense of shared national belonging 
was increasingly demanded of particularly new (but also some established) citizens in the interests 
of community cohesion. Galvanising a sense of shared national belonging and promoting ‘good 
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relations’ among community members is also a concern of the new Coalition Government with their 
mooted ideas such as the introduction of National Citizen Service, a new national ‘UK day’ and ‘Big 
Society’ projects. These ideas must, of course, be seen in a neoliberal framework of aggressive public 
service cuts and the ‘utility’ to the state of greater public involvement in front line service provision 
(see also Jessop 2002 on neocommunitarianism within governance). Rhetoric on ‘good relations’ and 
community cohesion should further be critiqued in the light of emerging literature from the 
geographies of encounter field (e.g. Laurier et al 2002, Amin 2006) that explores notions of prejudice 
in encounters and questions whether socially lubricating conduct between people always shapes 
underlying beliefs in broadly defined ‘positive’ or cohesive ways (Valentine 2008, Valentine and 
Waite 2011).  
 
The emphasis of citizenship has thus shifted from a framework of rights to one of responsibilities 
and obligations where migrant rights have become conditional upon acceptance of national values 
and loyalty to the state (Kofman 2005). The responsibilities inherent within citizenship are clearly 
articulated here: 
  
I think the really key factor is understanding what being a citizen of the UK means and what 
the responsibilities are.  [KI1, national migration enforcement agency, my emphasis] 
 
The mapping out of these responsibilities became ever clearer in Britain through the 
aforementioned ‘The Path to Citizenship’ (Home Office 2008). The document detailed the concepts 
of ‘probationary’15 and ‘earned citizenship’ and it was made explicit that migrants should earn the 
right to progress between the stages of this pathway; a perspective that is echoed here: 
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 Sveinsson (2010) notes that ‘probationary citizenship’ is actually a contradiction in terms as citizenship in 
liberal democracies confers certain rights, so if these are lacking it is no longer appropriate to talk of 
citizenship. ‘Probationary citizenship’ would thus amount to second-class citizenship which is generally 
regarded as a violation of human rights.  
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It’s a way of being able to establish a path to citizenship. Anything that makes it clearer, 
anything that clarifies the route to citizenship, a path to citizenship has to be a good thing 
and if we believe that making an economic contribution to the country is important and that 
can get you a speedy right to citizenship or volunteering - you know another important link 
into citizenship, making a contribution to communities - I think they’re good things and I 
agree with them. Anything that lays down the path and helps people understand how to 
achieve citizenship. [...] It also gives you the chance to double check that the people that 
we’re granting citizenship to are people who have behaved well while they’ve been here thus 
earning their right to citizenship. [KI1, national migration enforcement agency, my emphasis] 
 
The last part of this quote that dwells on the behaviour of would-be citizens is linked to the 
underlying sentiment in ‘The Path to Citizenship’; the assumption that potential citizens are 
undeserving and suspect by default thus justifying as reasonable the requirement for them to prove 
their worthiness and commitment to Britain (Sveinsson 2010). The above ringing endorsement of 
Labour policy is unsurprisingly heavily critiqued by other key informants in this research who were 
concerned that excessive managerialism within the new citizenship policies was designed to exclude 
and expel rather than to include and integrate; a hoop-jumping landscape littered with banana-skins 
ready to trip up would-be citizens:  
 
The business of becoming a British citizen has become one of selection and policing and 
monitoring migration flows; increasing the capacity of the decision makers to say no, 
increasing the range of tests that are going to be imposed on migrants and increasing 
enforcement powers. If they say no to you at any part of the stage, then irrespective of the 
fact that you might have brought your family over and that your kids have been in school for 
the last 4, 5, 6 years, then that's it, you know, you’ve reach your limits and you're expected to 
leave the country. [KI3, national migrant advocacy organisation] 
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A particularly vexatious element of the Path to Citizenship document for critics was the proposal for 
prospective citizens to earn an accelerated route to citizenship through demonstrating ‘active 
community participation’:  
 
This business of assessing participation levels is now part of the state sanctioned business of 
becoming a British citizen. The participation of the migrant is going to be commented on - 
migrants need to be able to demonstrate that they are making a positive contribution. [...] 
Everything becomes over politicised at every single stage, both from the point of view of the 
migrants but also from the perspective of the people who are supposed to be over-seeing it, 
voluntary organisations and so on,  but nobody really even knows what it is. [KI3, national 
migrant advocacy organisation] 
 
There was consternation that new citizens were being asked to prove their worth above and beyond 
what is required of British citizens, concern as to how active community participation will be 
assessed, and also alarm that appropriate allowances weren’t going to be made for people who are 
already heavily consumed in family and work spheres (MRCF & MRN 2010). The post-May 2010 new 
Government recently announced, however, that it is not in favour of Labour’s policy of making 
migrants ‘earn’ British citizenship through compulsory voluntary work. The coalition Government 
clearly wishes to distance itself from the so-called ‘active citizenship’ part of Labour’s policies, but an 
overall framework of tough and restrictive immigration policies (aggressive attempts to reduce net 
immigration and potential routes to permanent residence/citizenship) seem here to stay, at least in 
the short to medium-term. The focus in this section has been on how the political ‘demand to 
belong’ to the nation has become increasingly stitched into the fabric of contemporary British 
citizenship discourses. The next section will move on to exploring whether this demand to belong 
resonates for one of the main groups the policy discourse aims to influence; transnational migrants.  
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4: Feelings of belonging among transnational migrants 
 
How does the previously described prescriptive citizenship pathway and growing expectation for 
undivided loyalty to national cultures and polities fit with transnational migrants’ feelings of 
belonging? It is often the case that transnational migrants have multi-positioned relationships to 
different locales on account of their migratory journeys from a source to a destination area, the 
likely network of social, symbolic and material ties retained to their homelands, and the newer sets 
of social relations formed in a current place of residence. Migrants are therefore commonly 
observed to experience simultaneity in their feelings of belonging to different places (Wilson and 
Peters 2005) as a result of being ‘here and there’ and ‘straddling worlds’ (Gidwani and 
Sivaramakrishnan 2003). In recognition of these potentially complex sets of relationships across at 
least two locales, it is suggested that migrant groups embody a, “shifting landscape of belonging and 
identity” that is, “tied to a globalised and transnational social fabric rather than one bounded by the 
nation-state form” (Anthias 2006, p. 25, see also Massey and Jess 1995). Some of the Kenyan 
migrants in this research described such experiences as ‘inbetween-ness’: 
 
“Because merely being here and working here, living here – I'm British, but still I have very 
strong feelings that I belong there [Kenya] ... so I'm between.” [Kenyan, father] 
 
“I say maybe transiency, I feel in between. It’s half way through.” [Kenyan, mother] 
 
These respondents have lived in the UK for fairly lengthy periods of 6 and 9 years, yet they still feel 
strong emotional attachments to Kenya. Such narratives that partly promote country of origin 
identities echo Ehrkamp’s (2006) findings that Turkish migrants in Germany feel ‘cynical and 
resistant’ towards unilateral expectations of assimilation. This taps into policy makers’ fears; 
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anxieties that such distanciated senses of place-attachment will necessarily compromise the ability 
of transnational migrants to feel strong affinities to host nations (Werbner 2002). Yet it is 
questionable whether such transnational ties unequivocally eliminate all senses of belonging to 
country of residence (see also Hickman et al. 2008): 
 
R: Being Somali, that's who you are, that’s really what you are - Somali. [...] Being British and 
living here - it’s a different thing.  Well if you see, my life, I think it belongs more to England 
than Somalia. I think that that’s important to me because my children are English. [Somali, 
father]   
 
It is interesting in the above quote that the respondent uses ‘British’ when describing an ‘official’ 
identifier, but slips into using the term ‘English’ when describing senses of belonging that are 
perhaps more meaningfully constructed and less oriented around unitary state discourses with 
respect to national (British) identity. Staeheli & Nagel (2006, p. 1612) found in a U.S. context that 
the, “multivalent nature of home – incorporating material and metaphorical spaces – did not 
weaken attachment to the United States for many respondents. Rather, it seemed as though the 
multiple locations of home in some ways enriched respondents’ sense of Americanness.” Sveinsson’s 
(2010) research likewise revealed no inherent contradiction in belonging to more than one place as 
this should not be necessarily seen as a rejection of the host society and its values but rather the 
possibility of embracing both host and sending societies. 
 
Further, attachments can be formed at a variety of scales in a host society aside from the national 
level and throughout different aspects of identities. This research, for example, revealed that 
Somalis particularly claim Islamic identities in preference to racial, ethnic or national identities. Such 
asserted Muslim subject positions allowed attachments to place-based faith communities in the UK 
even if there is an active problematisation of prescribed cultural membership of hegemonic and top-
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down notions of ‘Britishness’ (i.e. an identity perceived by some to be refracted primarily through 
‘whiteness’). Stretched and plurilocal attachments can therefore be seen as being reconcilable and 
compatible with notions of simultaneous territorialised belonging for some (Ehrkamp and Leitner 
2006); but localised belonging frequently fails to intersect with top-down notions of unitary 
‘Britishness’.  
 
Feelings of non-belonging can emerge not only from stretched belongings conflicting with state 
demands for undivided national loyalties, but also through more prosaic feelings of exclusion in 
everyday spheres. Indeed, Anthias (2006, p. 21) says that, “[A]sking ‘where do I belong?’ may be 
prompted by a feeling that there are a range of spaces, places, locales and identities that we feel we 
do not, and cannot, belong to. [...] To belong is to share values, networks and practices and it is not 
just a question of identification.” These respondents elaborate:  
 
R: We do feel fairly foreign. We don’t feel like we belong.   
I: Are you made to feel foreign by people here? 
R: I think it’s more us than them. You feel you are foreign. Non-verbal or verbal. You just kind 
of feel it. [Kenyan, father]  
 
As much as I would like to see myself as a British person, the wider society doesn’t see me as 
that as well. Yeah, but when they see me walking the street, you know they say ‘oh, there's 
another foreigner’, ‘a refugee’, that's how the community labels you, that's the impression, 
‘another Somali, another refugee’. [Somali, mother]  
 
These feelings of (non)acceptance and (non)belonging may be further shaped by more tangible 
experiences of exclusion. It is well known that citizenship and immigration statuses can shape 
experiences of inclusion/exclusion through migrants being streamed into specific categories and 
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receiving differential rights and contingent access to citizenship. A particularly vulnerable group are 
asylum seekers and refugees (Dwyer 2005, Brown 2008) and participants in this study who came to 
Britain under this migration pathway (most of the Somali sample; and as indicated in the above 
quote, Somalis are often perceived as asylum seekers by the wider population even if they are not) 
tended to feel more social exclusion than migrants who came as students, economic migrants or 
family joiners (most of the Kenyan sample). Yet it would be misleading to suggest that such 
experiences were only manifest in the lives of the Somali asylum seekers and refugees; sadly 
discrimination and prejudice were encountered in some guise by most participants in this study and 
variously articulated feelings of non-belonging emerged16. The arenas in which this was encountered 
crossed employment spheres, educational places and everyday neighbourhood spaces. The 
perceived ‘reasons’ for discrimination varied from skin colour to religious association and to more 
general feelings of being identified as the ‘other’ with the associated presumption of non-belonging. 
This quote from a Kenyan participant reveals such racialized fear and prejudice (Naber 2006) derived 
from his different skin colour and accent: 
 
What I want to say is that there are very subtle reasons, it’s not overt, it’s covert. When I 
speak and my colour, so those are two levels you know. A man who wants to be biased 
against other people has a way of looking for ways of excluding others. [Kenyan, father] 
 
Several respondents chimed with the above suggestion of covert prejudice being experienced in 
mundane and everyday ways. Migrants said that feelings of non-belonging can be communicated to 
them by majority population groups in quite subtle ways; perhaps just through the way people look 
at them. Particular feelings of exclusion were reported by Somali Muslim participants in this 
                                                          
16
 Similarly, Sveinsson’s (2010) research involving 11 small-scale community studies found that most migrants 
experienced widespread prejudice and discrimination through deskilling, exploitation and unequal treatment 
in the labour market.  
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research to be a result of Islamophobia and the damaging effects of such religious intolerance since 
the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. and the 7/7 London bombings (Staeheli and Nagel 2008): 
 
Some people are ignorant. When I used to work at the bakery some people asked why I wear 
it [a headscarf].  What is to do with them? The clothes I wear don’t stop me doing a job. 
‘Maybe it is too hot for you?’ they say. People are ignorant. They judge without knowing you. 
We should be free to do what we want. But when it comes to work your appearance is seen 
as different because of the scarf. [Somali, mother]  
 
Ahmed (2004) engages with the emotions of cultural politics to show that the British nation is 
portrayed as an object of love; a discourse that citizens and residents of Britain alike are expected to 
subscribe to. Those not able to engage in this emotional discourse of national belonging (not 
desiring to due to transnational belongings, not being ‘allowed’ to due to persistent messages of 
exclusion, or a combination of both), perhaps most often migrants and people of ‘difference’, may 
therefore experience the emotions of non-belonging and dislocation that are encapsulated through 
the above series of quotes. The important point to emerge is that feelings of belonging are unlikely 
to be dictated entirely by the individual claiming to belong, but will also be influenced by that claim 
of belonging being recognised or legitimated by a wider community; as Anthias (2006, p. 19) says, 
“[T]o belong is to be accepted as part of a community”. 
 
This section has so far shown how Somali and Kenyan migrants’ stretched belongings can lead to an 
unwillingness and/or inability to subscribe to a singular notion of ‘Britishness’; this may combine 
with experiences of prejudice and discrimination which can compound feelings of dis-location from 
both local spaces and national polities. How do these potential multiple exclusions shape the way 
migrants come to negotiate the practices and processes of citizenship? Over the last decade, the 
policy environment around immigration has made it quite clear that citizenship acquisition, and the 
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journey towards it, should be a unifying experience that enhances a sense of belonging to Britain. 
Does this in fact play out in the lives of participants in this study? Here there is a notable difference 
in sentiments between the Somali and Kenyan participants in this research due to different 
migration pathways. Many of the first generation Somali participants entered Britain under the 
asylum route before gaining refugee status, and later British citizenship. This group of migrants 
therefore spoke of the significant security that comes with naturalisation and the legal protections of 
citizenship that led them to feel less vulnerable to infringements of immigration law (see also 
Staeheli and Nagel 2008). Many of the non-asylum route Kenyan respondents in this research, 
however, demonstrate a relatively unemotional engagement with citizenship; some disregard the 
importance of applying for citizenship as long as a work permit and leave to remain are assured, 
whilst others pragmatically apply for British citizenship for the travel ease and access to visas it 
affords them:  
At the moment I have Kenyan citizenship.  As long as you have a work permit it doesn’t make 
any difference. [Kenyan, mother] 
 
The British aspect of us is a convenience thing.  I mean we all want British passports not 
because it’s all wonderful but because of the conveniences that it gives you.   I don’t want to 
be stood on long queues in New York because I’m from Kenya so if I can help it let me get a 
British passport where I don’t have to negotiate to go to the Embassy. [Kenyan, father] 
 
Such an instrumental approach to the acquisition of British citizenship chimes with Mavroudi’s 
(2008:307) notion of ‘pragmatic citizenship’ that, “highlight[s] the strategic element of 
migrant/diasporic citizenship acquisition that enables and allows for multiple feelings of belonging 
that are positioned at particular times/spaces for particular reasons”. Pragmatic citizenship may be 
driven and shaped also by the feelings of non-belonging detailed above which leave some Kenyan 
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respondents separating the holding of a British passport from actually feeling they belong to Britain; 
an outcome that stands in stark contrast to what the Labour Government hoped its policies would 
have achieved: 
I really don't see myself as being British at all and I have lived in Britain for 6 years but I really 
strongly don’t see myself as British.  I mean you can live here and stuff but you can never 
really be truly British and you’ll always be reminded that. [...] While I’m here even if I got a 
British passport and people ask me what I am I’d say I’m still a Kenyan because that’s who I 
am, I am a product of where I’m from, I’m Kenyan. [Kenyan, father] 
 
British naturalisation is therefore viewed by most Kenyan respondents in this study as distinct from 
feelings of belonging to the nation, or ‘Britishness’; “Yeah according to nationality I’m British, but I’m 
still Maasai” [Kenyan, mother]. The earlier parts of this paper showed that state neo-assimilationist 
discourses link citizenship to understandings of belonging to the British nation; Kenyan respondents 
in this research in particular reveal that such understandings are rather narrowly construed in terms 
of their everyday lives and most feel unwilling and/or unable to emotionally subscribe to a national 
polity in the way the state has urged. 
 
Overall, this section has illustrated that attempts to galvanise feelings of belonging to Britain for 
transnational migrants are perhaps a little more complicated than the Labour Government 
imagined; and that the new Coalition Government also appears to be imagining according to early 
indications. A centrally imposed notion of Britishness seems not to have the desired effect of 
encouraging unitary emotional belonging to the nation (Ahmed 2004) among transnational migrants 
in this research due to complex sets of relationships across at least two locales and mundane 
prejudice leading to feelings of non-belonging at a variety of scales. The concluding section will 
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suggest that this context frames the often troublesome relationship that transnational migrants in 
Britain have with 21st century imposed articulations of Britishness. 
 
5: Conclusion  
 
This paper has explored what the UK’s immigration and citizenship policies and their increasingly 
neo-assimilationist articulation of national belonging mean for transnational migrants living in 
Britain. The paper began by charting the evolving nature of citizenship conceptualisations in Western 
neoliberal contexts and illustrated how Britain has responded to this shifting landscape. A large part 
of this story is set against the backdrop of enhanced ‘migration securitization’ amid a more general 
post-9/11 securitization landscape that has resulted in widespread societal fear (Furedi 2002, 2005); 
not only against external threats, but also implicitly framed as a fear of encounters with ‘different’ 
individuals. The state argues, or at the very least implies, that the integrity of the nation state and its 
security can only be assured if migration flows and migrants themselves (as emblematic of such 
‘difference’) are closely controlled and monitored. Extensive immigration policies are a key 
manifestation of the securitization agenda, and in Britain this is tied to attempts to bolster the 
formal institution of citizenship (with its attendant rights and responsibilities) and make more 
explicit links to notions of belonging to the nation. An active managerialist approach to migration 
(Kofman 2005) has therefore come to characterise British immigration policies as the state is 
increasingly preoccupied with forging national identity and social cohesion. Implicit within this neo-
assimilationist agenda is the Government’s incorporation of notions of belonging within the policy 
landscape of citizenship. The message is that certain ‘ways of belonging’ for migrants are critical to 
their settlement, integration and participation in civic life. Although a discussion in this paper of 
policy effects in respect of new and evolving policies is necessarily partial; the insights of the key 
informants in sections 2 and 3 of the paper are beginning to illustrate that these policies are 
breeding an environment that sometimes borders on the paranoid and appears to implicitly suggest 
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a separation of ‘us’ from ‘them’ (Staeheli and Nagel 2008) with an associated fear of the ‘other’. This 
has seamlessly led to successive Governments’ claims that migrant populations need to be closely 
monitored and managed. 
 
The UK state desires transnational migrants’ senses of belonging to cohere with state discourse; to 
feel an uncomplicated attachment to the nation and subscribe to a unitary British identity. Yet the 
findings of this paper, in part 4, demonstrate that transnational migrants’ feelings of belonging often 
exist in tension with neo-assimilationist policies designed to promote a core national identity. 
Transnational migrants commonly experience simultaneity in their feelings of belonging to different 
places (Wilson and Peters 2005) as a result of being ‘here and there’ and ‘straddling worlds’ 
(Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan 2003). This leaves them unable to unilaterally identify as ‘British’ or 
to feel singular emotional belonging to the nation (Ahmed 2004). Compounding this is the mundane 
prejudice and discrimination routinely experienced by the Somali and Kenyan migrants in this 
research which often leaves senses of exclusion from local spaces and associated alienation from 
imposed notions of Britishness. In terms of naturalisation and engagement with the neo-
assimilationist overtones of citizenship acquisition; most Kenyan respondents in particular view 
formal citizenship pragmatically (if they desire it at all) and feel either disinclined or unable to 
emotionally identify with a national identity in the way that Government citizenship policies urge. 
 
In sum, and following Ho (2009), this paper urges greater theoretical attention to the ways in which 
citizenship – and, to which I would also add; belonging (Waite and Cook 2010) - are constituted 
through emotions. In particular, scholars should not only explore how migrants’ emotional 
subjectivities emerge in response to citizenship governance (Ho 2009, p.789), but also countenance 
the possibility that transnational migrant emotional subjectivities may develop in spite of state neo-
assimilationist invocations of national belonging within overarching frameworks of ‘neoliberal 
citizenship’ (Sparke 2006). The governance of transnational migrants has been shown in this paper 
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to be challenging for successive Governments.  From the perspective of the state’s preoccupation 
with cultivating national belonging in the interests of promoting integration and social cohesion; 
transnational migrants can be seen as troublesome in that they embody distanciated belongings. 
Their resulting tenuous links to national belonging arise because transnational migrants often don’t 
wish to emotionally engage in a national project of unitary Britishness due to their transnational 
positionalities, and/or they may feel debarred from such an identity due to persistent social 
exclusions at the everyday scale. This paper has shown that the climate of paranoia surrounding the 
integration of migrants in a securitization era (Butler 2004) leaves a mismatch between the 
emotional belonging the state wants transnational migrants to feel to the nation, and that which 
participants in this study actually feel in terms of their multi-scaled and multi-positioned belongings.  
 
Yet a final point of this paper is that although current state rhetoric around citizenship and belonging 
is in discordance with many transnational migrants’ grounded experiences; such differently situated 
belongings should not be perceived as a threat to social cohesion. The current Government would 
do well to retreat from the emergent ‘neuropolitics’ (Isin 2004) of the 21st century and embrace a 
more inclusive and relaxed acceptance of migrants’ translocal belongings. These feelings may not 
cohere with current state discourse that requires strong senses of national belonging, yet they 
contribute to - rather than detract from - the grounded reality that multiple belongings enable 
transnational migrants to feel a certain ‘comfort’ (Noble 2005) of living in Britain. This in turn leads 
to what Giddens (1990) calls ‘ontological security’ or an emerging trust and integration in one’s 
surroundings and communities; something the British Government is surely working towards as an 
end-game. 
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